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THE SEARCH FOR INTENT: AIDS TO STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION IN FLORIDA
ROBERT M. RHODES,* JOHN WESLEY WHITE,**
AND ROBERT S. GOLDMAN***
I. INTRODUCTION
Statutory construction is the inevitable consequence of the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Primary lawmaking authority in Ameri-
can government is vested in the legislative branch, while the judici-
ary has the duty to interpret laws to further the legislative will. This
latter obligation has compelled the courts to develop techniques to
guide their search for the intent of a statute where the language is
unclear.
These techniques, often called aids to construction, may be classi-
fied as either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic aids confine the search
for statutory meaning to the four corners of the statute. Included in
this category are familiar canons of construction, such as ejusdem
generis' and expressio unius est exclusio alterius.2 Extrinsic aids, on
the other hand, contemplate matters outside the statute. Included
in this class are conditions at the time of the enactment, the history
of related legislation, administrative constructions, and evidence of
legislative intent reflected during the process of enactment.
This analysis focuses on the latter category of extrinsic aids and
includes committee reports, statements of sponsors and other legis-
lators, transcripts of committee hearings and floor debates, and
house journals.' This article will consider the value of these materi-
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M.P.A., Harvard University, 1973. Member of the Florida Bar and the law firm of Thompson,
Wadsworth, Messer, Turner & Rhodes, Tallahassee, Florida. Formerly, counsel to the speaker
of the Florida House of Representatives, 1971-1972.
** B.A., Florida State University; M.S.P.A., Florida State University; District Adminis-
trator of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, district 8. Former
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*** B.A.E., Georgia Institute of Technology, 1972; J.D., Florida State University, 1976.
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1. "[W]hen an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word or
phrase, then the general word or phrase will usually be construed to refer to things of the same
kind or species as those specifically enumerated." State ex rel. Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v.
Thompson, 101 So. 2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1958).
2. "[Eixpress mention of one thing is the exclusion of another. ... Dobbs v. Sea Isle
Hotel, 56 So. 2d 341, 342 (Fla. 1952).
3. For convenience, the terms "extrinsic aids" and "statutory history" as used herein refer
exclusively to this genus of materials, although they are generally regarded as embracing all
matters outside the statute.
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als to judicial interpretation of statutes and will explore options for
improving the availability of reliable extrinsic aids in Florida. The
disposition of Florida courts to recognize these materials will also
be analyzed.
R. PLAIN MEANING RULE
The cardinal rule of interpretation is that "a statute should be
construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature as expressed in the statute."' Many statutes are clear
and unambiguous, and the courts normally will not apply rules of
construction to question the effect of clear statutory language.
"Where the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and
unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or
interpretation of the statute, and the courts need only give effect to
the plain meaning of its terms."' This principle, known as the "plain
meaning rule," requires judicial determination of statutory ambigu-
ity as a prerequisite to judicial construction. The rule has an impor-
tant qualification, however:
When the legislative intent is clear from the words used in the
enactment, courts are bound thereby and may not seek a meaning
different from the ordinary or common usage connotation of such
words unless, upon a consideration of the act as a whole and the
subject matter to which it relates, the court is necessarily led to a
determination that the legislature intended a different meaning
6
As a practical matter, the question of whether the meaning is
"plain" often generates controversy. Harry Willmer Jones' com-
ment on the precision one can expect from language is instructive:
The statutory proposition must be expressed in words, and words
are notoriously inexact and imperfect symbols for the communica-
tion of ideas. Even if it be assumed that careful selection of the
statutory language will communicate to later interpreting judges
the same connotations, or general meanings, that the draftsman
had in mind, the infinite number of possible combinations of fact
is certain to cause some doubt as to the effect of the statute in
particular cases. Careful and expert draftsmanship may reduce the
4. Deltona Corp. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 220 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 1969).
5. State v. Egan, 287 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
6. Garner v. Ward, 251 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1971); 2A C. SANDS, SOUtmERLAND STATUTORY
CONSIRUCTION § 48.01 (4th ed. 1973).
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incidence of interpretative doubts; it can never make of statutory
interpretation a purely mechanical process.7
The effect of the plain meaning rule is to spur litigants whose
interests are advanced by construction to seek to persuade the court
that the statute is ambiguous. Conversely, even the most doubtful
statutory language will be "plain" in its meaning to the party whose
cause will suffer if the rules of construction are invoked.
Moreover, the determination that no ambiguity is present does
not foreclose construction. There is still room for dispute over
whether the legislature really meant what it so clearly expressed.,
Assuming, however, establishment of prima facie ambiguity, what
means will the courts employ to discern legislative intent?
III. EXTRINSIC AIDS: THE ARGUMENTS
Justice Frankfurter once referred to statutory construction as
"alchemy." ' Surely intrinsic aids warrant such a characterization.
These canons with their mystical Latin names confine the search for
meaning to the statute itself. In fact, intrinsic aids do not really
represent a search for "meaning" since their application is rigor-
ously structured: simply apply the proper maxim and behold the
legislative intent.
Unfortunately, statutes are not identical, and legislators and
draftsmen do not know which maxim will be applied in the future
to elucidate intended meaning. To be sure, the canons do not always
destroy the intent of the legislature. It seems illogical, however, to
rely on them exclusively when direct evidence of legislative intent
is within reach. For this reason, the trend in the United States since
the turn of the century has been increasingly to recognize extrinsic
aids to statutory interpretation. 0
Although extrinsic aids are frequently unavailable at the state
level," courts will rely on them in varying degrees when given the
7. Jones, Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts, 25 IOWA L. REv. 737, 739 (1940) (footnote
.omitted).
8. See Gay v. City of Coral Gables, 47 So. 2d 529 (Fla. 1950).
9. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 462 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
10. See Stringham, Crystal Gazing: Legislative History in Action, 47 A.B.A.J. 466 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Crystal Gazing]. See also Jones, supra note 7.
11. Although the trend in recent years is to improve recordkeeping in state legislatures, a
great deal of historical data remains unavailable in most states. Availability generally de-
pends on the nature of the information in question. Committee reports, for example, are far
more likely to be available than transcripts of floor debates in a given jurisdiction. See G.
FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: RESEARCH FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 5-6 (1972); THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1970-71, at 70-72 (1971).
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opportunity. The dual reasons underlying the judicial willingness to
consider extrinsic materials are noteworthy. First, if "legislative
intent" is the criterion of decision, it seems clear that the meaning
which the legislators themselves attributed to any measure during
the lawmaking process has evidentiary value. "If the purpose of
construction is the ascertainment of meaning, nothing that is logi-
cally relevant should be excluded."'" Second, legislative history,
when available, allows a court to avoid "all the artificialities which
make the rules of statutory construction an impenetrable tangle of
waste words. State court opinions are replete with archaic and
meaningless maxims which achieve results but which guarantee nei-
ther achievement of legislative policy nor professional respect.'
3
The trend toward increasing use of legislative materials also has
its critics. The principal objections and their counterarguments fol-
low.
(1) One objection reduces "legislative intent" to a legal fiction.
There is no such thing, it is said, as a collective purpose underlying
a particular enactment. Different legislators may have different
purposes in mind when they vote. Justice Jackson, in United States
v. Public Utilities Commission, argued for interpretation
by analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress.
When we decide from legislative history, including statements of
witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we
must put ourselves in the place of a majority of Congressmen and
act according to the impression we think this history should have
made on them. Never having been a Congressman, I am handi-
capped in that weird endeavor. That process seems to me not
interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute."
The answer to this argument is that lawmakers must be presumed
to possess a general understanding of the meaning and legal effect
of their enactments. If legislative history is available which clearly
reveals this understanding, a court is more likely to reach a result
consistent with the legislative will. On the other hand, if the histori-
cal evidence is itself ambiguous, the solution is for courts to accord
it less weight.
12. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 527, 541
(1947) [hereinafter cited as Reading of Statutes].
13. Horack, Cooperative Action for Improved Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAD. L. REv.
382, 387 (1950).
14. United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). But see Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943), in which Justice Jackson arguably relied
on considerable statutory history while professing otherwise.
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(2) This criticism also has refinements. Legislatures, it is
argued, often enact deliberately vague statutes, casting upon the
courts the burden of decisions which lawmakers wish to avoid.
Thus, the search for statutory history may produce a frustrating
scenario wherein judges are "running in circles with the legislators,
looking for something that isn't there . . . .The judges . . .are
passing the buck to the legislature, the same buck originally passed
to the court in the form of unclear words."' 5
This proposition does not withstand scrutiny. It ignores the limits
imposed on judicial decisionmaking by the doctrine of separation of
powers. As Professor Horack observed, that doctrine is not absolute:
"The necessary legislative effect of many interpretative decisions is
so clear that it hardly can be imagined how the court might dis-
charge its judicial functions without interstitially exercising a lim-
ited legislative function."'" To suggest that the construction of a
statute involves an element of judicial legislation is one thing; to
suggest that a court should ignore available information that would
minimize this element is quite another. The primary responsibility
for enunciating the policy and purpose of legislation is with the
legislature."
If the courts must ignore statutory history and must also avoid
making legislative policy, what remains to guide them? Their per-
sonal predilections? Anachronistic canons of construction? Even
assuming that extrinsic aids to which a court might otherwise resort
are "misleading," is there any reason to believe that adherence to
the canons will produce a better result?
Some ambiguity must be expected in statutes. The legislature
cannot be expected to foresee every factual situation that may arise,
for "[statutes come out of the past and aim at the future."'" How-
ever, deliberate ambiguity should not be presumed as a basis for
rejection of extrinsic aids.
(3) It is often suggested that legislative history is
"manufactured" in a deceptive fashion. Many statements appear-
ing in the Congressional Record, it is said, are not offered in debate
or are made merely to establish "legislative intent" consistent with
15. Washy, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A Caveat, 12 J.
PuB. L. 262, 267 (1963) [hereinafter cited as A Caveat].
16. Horack, supra note 13, at 389.
17. Justice Frankfurter once observed: "The vital difference between initiating policy,
often involving a decided break with the past, and merely carrying out a formulated policy,
indicates the relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly open to courts and the
extent to which interpreting law is inescapably making law." Reading of Statutes, supra note
12, at 534.
18. Id. at 535.
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the declarant's wishes." Fordham and Leach respond to this conten-
tion:
Abuses in the form of manufactured legislative history would be
disturbing if beyond control. But are they? Where the facts as to
the ersatz character of legislative history can be ferreted out by
opposing counsel that material can, of course, be discredited. We
favor enlargement of the sources of legislative interpretation at the
same time that we would eliminate formal rules in the nature of
presumptions. Instead of indulging assumptions we would weigh
all relevant data.
A concomitant of a thorough legislative process at the state level
would be the development of committee reports, hearings and
other documents which constitute 'legislative history.' It, thus,
would enrich the sources of interpretation of state statutes."
(4) An additional criticism is that use of extrinsic aids abrogates
a fundamental legal premise-that the citizen is held accountable
for his actions because he is presumed to know the governing law.
A citizen, however, should not be punished for violating a commit-
tee report or a sponsor's statement during debate.2
These objections are persuasive. Were it not for the existence of
adequate means to avoid these pitfalls, the courts would certainly
discard the use of extrinsic materials. However, when basic rights
are at issue, the courts may construe a statute prospectively 2 or find
it unconstitutionally vague. 23 The light which statutory history
19. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as
Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 128 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as A Reexamination]; A Caveat, supra note 15, at 264.
20. Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3
VAND. L. REV. 438, 455 (1950).
21. See generally United States v. Korpan, 354 U.S. 271 (1957). In a blistering attack on
judicial use of legislative history, one commentator argues:
There was no reason to believe that [litigant] Korpan was in the visitor's gallery
when Senator So-and-So made his speech. How then was Korpan bound to know
that the speech was part of the law? Is everyone in the United States charged with
knowing every word that is uttered on the floors of Congress? Must we read all of
the Congressional Record every day-and remember it day after day, year after
year, in order to keep out of jail? Is that due process of law?
Crystal Gazing, supra note 10, at 467. On another occasion, the United States Supreme Court
regarded use of extrinsic aids as a practical circumvention of the ex post facto clause: "If a
state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow
that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely
the same result by judicial construction." Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-54
(1964).
22. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 (1964). See also Keeler v. Superior Court,
470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
23. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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sheds on legislative meaning need not blind a court to the constitu-
tion.
Each of these arguments has been raised frequently in objection
to the use of extrinsic aids to statutory construction. The preponder-
ance of case law dismisses attempts to limit the evidence which the
courts may consider, although the weight accorded such evidence
varies from case to case.
Recognizing the lack of clearly defined general standards for use
of extrinsic aids, we now turn to an examination of specific aids. We
shall consider federal and other states' court decisions on the use of
specific aids in an effort to determine appropriate criteria which
might be of use in Florida. In this process, we will also see the
manner in which these specific aids are now used in Florida.
IV. REPORTS OF STANDING COMMITTEES
Standing committee reports are frequently relied on by the courts
to determine legislative intent.24 Committee reports have been said
to be "the most persuasive indicia of legislative intent." 5 In Zuber
v. Allen,2 the United States Supreme Court gave virtually conclu-
sive weight to a house report that arguably conflicted with a less
"impressive" floor debate. Woodrow Wilson depicted the commit-
tees as "little legislatures, '27 and scholars have equated committee
intention with legislative intention:
The great weight which is attached to the reports of legislative
committees indicates that the federal courts, within certain limits,
24. Wheeler v. Barbara, 417 U.S. 402 (1974); Passenger Corp. v. Passengers Ass'n, 414
U.S. 453 (1974); Miller v. Monrean, 507 P.2d 771 (Alaska 1973) (House Judiciary Committee
Report); Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 120 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1942) (Con-
gressional committee report); People v. Swinney, 46 Cal. App. 3d 332 (Cal. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (Assembly Committee on Criminal Procedure report); Menzies v. Fisher, 334 A.2d 452
(Conn. 1973) (committee member's statement in presenting bill regarded as committee re-
port); People v. Touhy, 201 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. 1964); Lightbody v. Russell, 58 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y.
1944) (Congressional committee report); North Carolina Corp. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 117
S.E. 563 (N.C. 1923) (statement by member of committee in charge of bill-federal statute);
Sorlien v. North Dakota Workmen's Comp. Bureau, 84 N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1957) (Congres-
sional committee report); Central Trust Co. v. Gilardi, 186 N.E.2d 771 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1.
1962) (committee comments in annotated code); State v. Laemoa, 533 P.2d 370 (Or. Ct. App.
1975) (committee minutes); City of Philadelphia v. Phillips, 116 A.2d 243 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1955).
25. Housing Auth. v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1, 6 n.7 (8th Cir. 1972). In
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court attached greater weight
to a Senate report where the House report was not published until after the Senate had
already passed its bill.
26. 396 U.S. 168 (1969).
27. G. FoLsoM, supra note 11, at 26 (citing W. WILsoN, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 113
(1913)).
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have come to accept the 'intention' of the committees as the
'intention' of Congress. Formal committee reports, in which pro-
spective enactments are explained to the general membership of
the House and Senate, are the most favored of all of the extrinsic
aids, and there are many decisions in which the courts have been
greatly influenced in their interpretation of doubtful statutory lan-
guage by the construction placed upon the respective bills in the
reports of House, Senate, and conference committees. 8
"Further extension of the use of this aid in state courts depends only
on the development of the standing committee report in the state
legislatures to something more than a mere recommendation." 9
The primary justification for attaching great weight to standing
committee reports is explained by Folsom:
The primary function of the committee report is to inform the
house to which the committee reports-to apprise that body of the
substance of the committee's recommendations and its reasons
therefor. To the extent that the house passes the provisions as
recommended by the committee, it is considered to have adopted
as its own the views stated in the report."
An example of the weight given standing committee reports is
Gooch v. United States,' in which the clear legislative purpose dis-
closed by a standing committee report prevailed over the rule of
ejusdem generis.32
The principal criticism of the use of committee reports as an aid
to construction is that the reports do not represent true legislative
intent since they are generally prepared by only a few legislators
who fully appreciate the substance of the reports. The same argu-
ment has been made about the use of records of committee hearings.
Judge Learned Hand's response to these contentions is instructive:
It is of course true that members who vote upon a bill do not all
know, probably very few of them know, what has taken place in
committee. On the most rigid theory possibly we ought to assume
that they accept the words just as the words read, without any
background of amendment or other evidence as to their meaning.
But courts have come to treat the facts more really; they recognize
28. Jones, supra note 7, at 743.
29. C. SANDS, supra note 6, § 48.06, at 204.
30. G. FoLsoM, supra note 11, at 28.
31. 297 U.S. 124 (1936). See also Southern Pac. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 120
P.2d 880 (Cal. 1942).
32. Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936).
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that while members deliberately express their personal position
upon the general purposes of the legislation, as to the details of its
articulation they accept the work of the committees; so much they
delegate because legislation could not go on in any other way."
Florida appellate court cases are noticeably silent on the use of
standing committee reports to assess legislative intent. This appears
to result from two facts: (1) committee reports on bills are not re-
quired by the Florida Senate and House of Representatives, and (2)
reports which are prepared are often misplaced and ultimately inac-
cessible.
Legislative committees in Florida do, however, prepare reports on
many bills.34 Generally, these reports are written to support legisla-
tion developed de novo by a committee, although, less frequently,
reports are prepared to explain legislation which has been referred
to the committee for consideration and recommendation. In many
instances, these reports are prepared for use by the committee itself,
or for release to the public, and do not appear to be intended to
educate or persuade the general membership of the legislature.3 5
More often, when the purpose is to persuade the members of the
whole body, materials take the form of "fact sheets" or memoranda
which are extremely transitory and are rarely retained beyond the
time of floor consideration of the bill.38 When full reports are pre-
pared, there is generally an adequate effort to disseminate the re-
port to interested persons, although it is not unusual for the person-
nel of the legislative library incidentally or randomly to discover an
oversight in providing the library with a copy of a report.
In 1976, the legislature enacted chapter 76-276,31 which requires
the house and the senate to "consider the economic impact . . .
legislation will have upon the public and the agencies of govern-
ment" prior to enactment of any general or special law.39 Commit-
tees of both houses implement this law by preparing "Economic
Impact Statements" (EIS). These are generally updated as neces-
sary as bills are amended by various committees and distributed to
legislators on the floor. After a bill is passed, a copy of the EIS is
33. SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
34. Interviews with Allen C. Morris, clerk, Florida House of Representatives (Sept. 10,
1976) and Joe Brown, secretary, Florida Senate (Sept. 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Inter-
views with Morris and Brown].
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Interview with B. Eugene Baker, director, Legislative Library Division, Tallahassee,
Fl. (Sept. 17, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Baker Interview].
38. Ch. 76-276, 1976 Fla. Laws 750 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 11.075 (1977)).
39. Id.
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filed with the legislative library along with the bill, indexed by bill
number.
The respective houses have different methods of implementation,
however. The senate prepares EIS's for all proposed legislation,
while the house first determines whether the fiscal impact warrants
an EIS. The house has incorporated the EIS requirement by direct
reference to the statute in house rule 7.16, governing preparation of
fiscal notes. The corresponding senate provision, rule 3.13, includes
no such reference.
Although the house and senate EIS forms are not identical, basi-
cally they require the same information. The purpose of the bill
must be set forth, with a description of the present situation and the
intended effect of the legislation. This is followed by a cost/benefit
analysis.
When substantive reports on legislation other than EIS's are re-
ceived by the legislative library, they are coded by subject matter
and are incorporated into the materials held by the library." Al-
though appropriate as a procedure for a legislative reference library,
this process does not build productive resources for researching leg-
islative intent.
Whether or not committee reports are filed with the legislative
library, committee offices generally retain copies of reports which
have been produced on specific legislation, but there is no require-
ment to do so, and retrieval or location of such reports in committee
files several years after enactment may be difficult.4 Despite consci-
entious work by the legislative library, one must conclude that re-
tention of reports of standing committees in a manner which might
be helpful to research on legislative intent is haphazard at best.
These are indeed the most important of extrinsic aids. And lack of
adequate access to these reports undoubtedly has contributed to the
paucity of appellate decisions relying on these aids.
V. REPORTS OF SPECIAL COMMIrTEES
Reports of standing committees at the state level often include
only the committee's recommendation regarding a measure. Fre-
quently, however, special committees are created specifically to in-
vestigate problem areas and propose legislation. The reports of these
committees are generally extensive, and the courts have found them
useful aids in construing statutes enacted pursuant to committee
recommendation .42
40. Baker Interview, supra note 37.
41. Interviews with Morris and Brown, supra note 34.
42. Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951); Reinel v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
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Reliance on . . . the committee reports can be justified in two
ways. First, because of their specialization and the concentration
of their experience, these committees possess a good deal of exper-
tise in their respective areas. Second, since the legislature estab-
lishes the committees for specific purposes, it is reasonable to as-
sume that in voting for the bill the legislature accepts the defini-
tion of its purpose promulgated by the committee. 3
Many states have also established revision commissions to study
and recommend legislation." The courts generally treat the reports
and comments of these commissions in the same fashion as reports
of special committees of the legislature. 5 Similar treatment is often
accorded reports and notes of national commissions." The Florida
Supreme Court, for instance, relied upon the notes of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in Sheffield-Briggs Steel Products,
Appeals Bd., 254 Cal. App. 2d 340 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Connecticut Rural Rds.
Improvement Ass'n v. Hurley, 197 A. 90 (Conn. 1938); Hood Rubber Co. v. Commissioner of
Corps. & Taxation, 167 N.E. 670 (Mass. 1929);Kuperschmid v. Globe Briefcase Corp., 58
N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1945); Lithium Corp. of America v. Bessemer City, 135 S.E.2d 574
(N.C. 1964); State v. Chase, 355 P.2d 631 (Or. 1960); Mullis v. Celanese Corp. of America,
108 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 1959); Buehler Bros. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 265 N.W. 227 (Wis.
1936).
43. Comment, Statutory Construction-Legislative Intent-Use of Extrinsic Aids in
Wisconsin, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 660, 663-64.
44. The Council of State Governments reports that all states and United States territories
have such commissions or councils except the following: Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Hawaii,
Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Puerto Rico,
South Carolina, Virgin Islands, Washington, and West Virginia. See THE COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERSmESTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1975-1974, at 86-91 (1975).
45. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953); Keeler v. Superior
Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970) (commissioners' notes); Reimel v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 254 Cal. App. 2d 340 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Hohreiter v. Garrison, 184
P.2d 323 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1947); Ketchmark v. Lynch, 246 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1969) (notes); State v. Gyles, 313 So. 2d 799 (La. 1975); Allers v. Tittsworth, 309
A.2d 476 (Md. 1973); Byfield v. Newton, 141 N.E. 658 (Mass. 1923); State v. Johnson, 141
N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1966) (comments); Deerfield Bldg. Corp. v. Yorkstate Indus., 353
N.Y.S.2d 331 (S. Ct. 1974); State v. Laemoa, 533 P.2d 370 (Or. Ct. App. 1975) (minutes of
law revision commission); In re Martin's Estate, 74 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1950).
46. Bindcyzk v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951); Kaplan v. Superior Court, 491 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1971); Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 437 P.2d 508 (Cal. 1968); H. Duys & Co. v. Tone, 5 A.2d 23
(Conn. 1939); Sheffield-Briggs Steel Prods. v. Ace Concrete Servs. Co., 63 So. 2d 924 (Fla.
1953) (notes of Commissioner on Uniform State Laws); Warren's Kiddie Shoppe, Inc. v.
Casual Slacks, 171 S.E.2d 643 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969); Eads v. J. & J. Sales Corp, 275 N.E.2d
802 (Ind. 1971); City of New Bedord v. New Bedford, 114 N.E.2d 553 (Mass. 1953); Bank of
America Nat'l Ass'n v. LaReine Hotel Corp., 156 A. 28 (N.J. Ch. 1931); In re McComb's
Estate, 80 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1948) (report, comments of Ohio Bar committee);
Young v. Kaye, 279 A.2d 759 (Pa. 1971) (UCC comments); People's Sav. & Trust Co. v.
Munset, 249 N.W. 527 (Wis. 1933). But see Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor &
Indus. Relations Appeal Bd., 482 P.2d 151 (Hawaii 1971) (studies by nonmember of legisla-
ture carry less weight than legislative committee reports or debates).
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Inc. v. Act Concrete Services Co. 7 The action was brought to estab-
lish priority of mechanic's liens under chapter 84, Florida Statutes. 8
The court noted that the statute was in all pertinent respects identi-
cal with the Model Mechanic's Lien Act of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws:
In ascertaining the legislative intent, courts consider, among
other factors, the history of the Act. State Board of Accountancy
v. Webb, Fla., 51 So. 2d 296. The subject Act had been pub-
lished-along with the Commissioners' explanatory notes-for at
least two years prior to its enactment by the Florida Legislature.
The same notes we quote from here were available to the Legisla-
ture when the Act was adopted."
The court then quoted the Commissioners' notes and relied on them
in its holding. This treatment of the Commissioners' notes suggests
that the court would have a similar attitude toward reports of spe-
cial committees of the Florida Legislature."
Special or select committees and commissions in Florida are
much more likely to present specific reports on proposed legislation
than standing committees.8 Many of the same problems associated
with location and retrieval of standing committee reports also apply
to reports of special committees or commissions. However, the sin-
gular focus of these special groups may make their submittals more
formal and visible. Florida appellate courts have not yet relied on a
report of a special committee or a state commission to establish
legislative intent. However, the cases suggest that the courts would
be favorably disposed to rely upon such aids.
VI. REPORTS OF CONFERENCE COMMI'rEES
Reports of conference committees become particularly important
where the language differs in the versions of similar legislation
passed by the two houses. This importance springs from the fact
that usually a conference committee recommendation cannot be
amended by either house, but must be either accepted or rejected. 52
Few courts outside the federal system have been presented with
47. 63 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 1953).
48. FLA. STAT. ch. 84 (1977).
49. Sheffield-Briggs Steel Prods., Inc. v. Ace Concrete Servs. Co., 63 So. 2d 924, 926 (Fla.
1953).
50. See sources cited notes 40, 42 and 43 supra.
51. Interview with Morris, supra note 34.
52. See, e.g., Rule 4.5 of the Rules of the Florida Senate and Rule 6.14 of the Rules of the
Florida House of Representatives.
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conference committee reports.53 However, when such reports are
used, they are likely to receive great weight.54 Florida appellate
courts have not relied on conference committee reports in determin-
ing legislative intent. Probably this is because such committees
report only recommendations on resolution of differences, with vir-
tually no explanation of reasoning.
A review of the journals of the Florida Senate and the Florida
House of Representatives reveals that reports of conference commit-
tees generally take the form of brief letters of transmittal to the
officers of the two houses, recommending specific amendments to
reconcile the differing versions of the legislation. Little is revealed
about explicit legislative intent, although much can be inferred by
the adoption of one alternative instead of another. In some instan-
ces, comparison summaries are made among the house, senate, and
conference committee recommendations. Usually, however, these
are informal "fact sheets" revealing very little about intent and they
are not systematically retained.
Perhaps the closest thing to a true conference committee report
in Florida is the "Letter of Intent" signed by the chairmen of the
senate and house committees responsible for appropriations. This
letter is prepared collaboratively by the staffs of these committees,
purportedly as a result of matters resolved by the respective com-
mittees and/or the appropriations conference committee. The letter
is usually prepared after adjournment of the legislature. It is not
available to the membership of the legislature when voting on final
passage of the appropriations bill. Nonetheless, it is a potentially
valuable source of information for the courts in determining legisla-
tive intent in state fiscal and administrative matters.
VII. COMMITTEE HEARINGS
The federal courts are willing to consider records of committee
proceedings in construing statutes, 5 but other extrinsic aids (e.g.,
committee reports) may carry more evidentiary weight.56 Judicial
reliance on committee proceedings has been criticized. Wasby
points out the dangers of resorting to such materials:
53. C. SANDs, supra note 6, § 48.08.
54. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 366 U.S. 169 (1961)
(highly persuasive); Leedom v. International Union of Mine Workers, 352 U.S. 145 (1956)
(highly persuasive).
55. Passenger Corp. v. Passengers Ass'n, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. General Tel. & Tel. Corp., 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
56. C. SANDs, supra note 6, § 48.10. In Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969), the Supreme
Court regarded oral statements by witnesses as more persuasive than written presentations.
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Although a hearing transcript does provide some indication of the
intention of some of the committee members, at best it provides
only partial evidence. Hearings may, for example, be held by only
those committee members interested in the passage of the legisla-
tion, or in its defeat. The questioning of witnesses is not unlikely
to be conducted with the aim of eliciting support for the ques-
tioner's position or discrediting the statements of hostile or unfa-
vorable witnesses, and the latter may not be as well represented
as those taking the majority view, because of invitations the com-
mittee has extended to those it already favors. 7
Nevertheless, courts are likely to continue to consider statements
made at committee hearings where the records are available. Cer-
tainly, one may assume that judges will exercise reasoned judgment
in relying on these materials. The weight attached to committee
proceedings as extrinsic aids should vary with their reliability as
disclosed by the circumstances of each factual situation.
In Florida, although committee proceedings are almost always
taped, these tapes usually are not transcribed."8 Some committees
forward their tapes to the legislative library, where they are retained
for an indefinite period. Other committees do not deliver their tapes
to the library. Rather, they erase them for re-use or retain them
indefinitely. Thus, the researcher interested in Florida legislative
committee proceedings must determine: (1) whether the proceeding
was taped, (2) if so, whether the tape still exists; and (3) if so, where
it is located. In many cases, the difficulties associated with making
these determinations are insurmountable. The result is a complete
absence of case law in Florida in which committee hearings have
been offered to prove legislative intent.
VIII. FLOOR DEBATES
Courts have generally refused to consider statements made during
floor debate as evidence of legislative intent." Various reasons have
been advanced for this rule. Some legislators may not have been
57. A Caveat, supra note 15, at 272.
58. Baker Interview, supra note 37.
59. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Ex parte Goodrich, 117 P.
451 (Cal. 1911); Bagg v. Wickizer, 50 P.2d 1047 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1935); Charlton Press,
Inc. v. Sullivan, 214 A.2d 354 (Conn. 1965) (dictum); Cicchino v. Biarsky, 61 A.2d 163 (N.J.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1948); In re Martin's Estate, 74 A.2d 120 (Pa. 1950); C. SANDS, supra note
6, § 48.13. Arguments against use of statements made in floor debates based upon the prob-
able absence of some legislators are advanced by Stringham, Crystal Gazing, supra note 10,
at 470. The problem presented by the opportunity which congressmen have to amend their
remarks prior to publication of the Congressional Record is noted in A Caveat, supra note
15, at 264.
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present during floor debate. Often what is said in debate is for the
benefit of constituents only and may be regarded by courts as self-
serving. Furthermore, supporters of a controversial measure may
fear that too much explanation and discussion will cause its defeat,
and thus they attempt to minimize debate. At the federal level,
congressmen have been free to amend their remarks before publica-
tion, so the record may not accurately reflect the proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Peckham, stated:
[I]t is impossible to determine with certainty what construction
was put upon an act by the members of a legislative body that
passed it by resorting to the speeches of individual members
thereof. Those who did not speak may not have agreed with those
who did; and those who spoke might differ from each other. .... .
Similarly, in a recent decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
concluded: "[W]hat was said on the floor of the legislature is irrele-
vant and inadmissible here, of no consequence whatsoever and, as
this case illustrates, can be so ambiguous as to cause confusion
rather than clarification."'"
Nunez warns that those opposed to a bill may attempt to place
their own construction of the measure in the record in order to
influence subsequent judicial construction.2 He also points out that
the process of enactment is lengthy and complicated. A bill passes
through committees, public hearing, and floor debates in one house
of a bicameral legislature, only to begin a similar journey in the
other. Thus, the "intent" expressed during a debate at one point in
the process may not be the intent at all when the vote is taken. 3
These arguments merit response. The choice is not between a rule
of absolute exclusion and one that would obtain legislative intent
solely by reference to floor debate. To permit courts to resort to such
statements is not to compel them to do so. Proper techniques for
dealing with ambiguous statutory history also apply to floor de-
bates. If, from a consideration of all relevant materials, the court
concludes that statements made during debate are not determina-
tive, or that they confuse rather than clarify, they should be given
60. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897).
61. Commonwealth v. Alcoa Properties, Inc., 269 A.2d 748, 749 (Pa. 1970) (footnote omit-
ted).
62. A Reexamination, supra note 19, at 133.
63. Id. at 134; see International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d
913 (9th Cir. 1975).
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less consideration. In his article on extrinsic aids in federal courts,
Jones explains:
It would seem that the factors mentioned should be regarded as
going to the probative value of the debates in particular cases, and
not to their general admissibility. A judge is certainly not bound
to accept the construction put upon a statute by a legislator who
may have been speaking only for himself, but as a judge he will
surely have had sufficient experience in weighing evidence to ena-
ble him to make an accurate estimate of the degree to which a
statement made during debate reflects the general understanding
of the legislative body as a whole.
The discovered circumstance that no objection was taken to the
construction placed upon a bill by a speaker in debate would be
at least some evidence that the speaker's understanding of its
meaning was shared by the other members. If, moreover, a com-
parison of the several speeches made in debate on a measure indi-
cates that each speaker was of the same belief as to the meaning
or legal effect of the statute, that concordance would be highly
persuasive evidence of a prevailing legislative judgment. The flat
exclusionary rule, barring any introduction of the records of de-
bate, would withhold from the consideration of the judges evidence
of "intention" which might be of great assistance in difficult cases,
particularly when the other legislative sources are silent or con-
flicting."'
Decisions in the federal courts since 1950 reveal an increasing
relaxation of the rule excluding reliance on legislative debates. Ex-
planatory statements by the sponsor of a bill may now be consid-
ered 5 as well as those of a standing committee member in charge
of presenting the bill to the house.6 These remarks are regarded as
supplemental committee reports. 7
Also admissible are debates reflecting a common agreement
among legislators of the meaning of ambiguous language"5 and re-
marks of legislators during debate which tend to show the evils at
which the statute was aimed. 9 Often the courts will vary the weight
64. Jones, supra note 7, at 751-52 (footnote omitted).
65. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
66. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S.
427 (1952).
67. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). See also note 27 supra.
68. First Nat'l Bank v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
69. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967); Galvan v. Press, 347
U.S. 522 (1954).
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attached to floor debates according to the apparent authority of the
speaker and other relevant circumstances. 0 Statements made by
opponents of a bill have also been considered.7' Finally, courts may
refer to floor proceedings to corroborate a result already reached.72
Because most states do not maintain records of legislative de-
bates,73 few state courts have had the opportunity to consider their
probative value." In Florida, floor debates in both houses are re-
corded but are rarely transcribed.75 Tapes are kept in the offices of
the clerk of the house of representatives and the secretary of the
senate. Both officers stress, however, that the manner of recordation
and storage makes these tapes informal working tools rather than
official records of legislative proceedings.7" Neither house has a for-
mal policy on retention of tapes, although current practice is to
retain them indefinitely pending the development of such a policy.
70. United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); see Note, Trends in the
Use of Extrinsic Aids in Statutory Interpretation, 3 VAND. L. REv. 586 (1950) [hereinafter
cited as Trends]; cf. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
71. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963); United Shoe Workers v. Bedell, 506 F.2d
174 (D.C. Cir. 1974); cf. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973).
72. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); United States v. Bhagat
Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); Jones, supra note 7.
73. A 1971 study by the Council of State Government reveals that only Connecticut,
Guam, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, the Virgin Islands, and West Virginia "always" maintain verbatim records of house
proceedings. In New York, the record is available only to the press; in Utah tape recordings
are made and are unavailable to the public for ten years. The Hawaii and New Hampshire
Senates are listed as "usually" keeping a verbatim record; Washington "sometimes" keeps
house records, and Michigan and North Dakota "rarely" maintain records of debate. Louis-
iana keeps them "in part." See THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
1970-71, at 70-72 (1971). See also Cashman, Availability of Records of Legislative Debates,
24 Rac. A.B. CITY N.Y. 153 (1969).
74. Hartford Elec. Light Co. v. Wethersfield, 332 A.2d 83 (Conn. 1973) (statement of
purpose of statute "strong indicator" of legislative intent, though not controlling); Bird v.
Plunkett, 95 A.2d 71 (Conn. 1953) (statement of committee chairman in the nature of a
supplemental committee report); Twentieth Century Furniture, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Rela-
tions Bd., 482 P.2d 151 (Hawaii 1971) (dictum); Moran v. Bowley, 179 N.E. 526 (Il. 1932)
(federal statute); Decatur Tp. v. Board of Comm'rs, 39 N.E.2d 479 (Ind. Ct. App. 1942)
(dictum); Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Violet Trapping Co., 176 So. 2d 425 (La. 1965)
(dictum); State ex rel Rogers v. Swanson, 219 N.W.2d 726 (Neb. 1974) (floor debate consid-
ered); People v. Cooney, 87 N.Y.S.2d 23 (Mag. Ct. 1949) (dictum); Fontheim v. Third Ave.
Ry., 12 N.Y.S.2d 90 (App. Div. 1939) (dictum); Seneca County v. State, 47 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Ct.
Cl. 1942), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 501 (1944); Neff v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 Ohio Op. 461 (Com. Pl.
1941) (sponsor's statements regarded as supplemental committee report); Southern Ry. v.
Fowler, 497 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1973) (speech to state senate, by sponsor of constitutional
amendment); Ex parte Peede, 170 S.W. 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1914) (plain meaning of federal
statute corroborated by author's remarks in Congress); Snow's Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Mor-
gan, 494 P.2d 216 (Wash. 1972) (committee chairman's responses to questioning taken as the
opinion of the committee as to the meaning of the bill).
75. Interviews with Morris and Brown, supra note 34.
76. Id.
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Both houses maintain a cooperative attitude toward supplying cop-
ies of tapes of floor debates to interested persons, and a high-speed
tape copying machine has been acquired to facilitate this service.
IX. JOURNALS
American courts uniformly utilize legislative journals to track
changes in a bill as it proceeds through the enactment process.!
Florida decisions are in harmony with the other jurisdictions. In
State ex rel Finlayson v. Amos, the court consulted the journals and
relied on the action taken on amendments:
It was through no mere inadvertence that the Legislature did this
[changed the basis for fixing the price of a license on a given class
of vehicle], because the amendment was first considered and
adopted in the House, next considered and rejected in the Senate,
then considered by a conference committee composed of members
from both houses, and thereafter adopted by the Senate upon rec-
ommendation of the conference committee.7 1
Similarly, in McDonald v. Roland,79 the Florida Supreme Court
referred to the history of the statute as reflected in the journals: 0
[O]riginal House Bill No. 154 was modified in committee by
changing the word "shall" throughout section 39.18 of the original
bill to "may" and by inserting the word "permissible" in subsec-
tions 39.18(2) (f) and 39.18(6). . . . Thus it appears that in the
process of enactment of the provisions relevant to the matter be-
fore us, the use of the word "shall", having a normal mandatory
meaning and connotation, has been rejected in favor of "may",
having a normal meaning of permission. We think, therefore, that
the specific purpose and intent of the legislature with respect to
section 39.18 is so clear that it must withstand whatever inconsist-
ent general intent may be argued for the Chapter as a whole.
Where the legislature has thus advisedly expressed its specific in-
tention, we are not permitted, by the application of a general rule
of statutory construction, to read into the resulting statute a con-
trary meaning and effect which the legislature has manifestly re-
jected.8
77. C. SANDS, supra note 6, § 48.18.
78. 79 So. 433, 435 (Fla. 1918).
79. 65 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1953).
80. See text accompanying notes 52-55 supra.
81. 65 So. 2d at 14.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
So where the legislature adopts language expressed in an amend-
ment to the original bill, the courts consider this persuasive evi-
dence that the original language and its connotation were rejected.
Conversely, rejection of a proposed amendment strongly suggests
that the language or amendment is inconsistent with the legislative
will. Sands adds a note of caution, however.8" An amendment may
be adopted because it clarifies, rather than changes, the intended
meaning. On the other hand, the amendment may be rejected be-
cause the bill as originally written better expresses the legislative
intent.
The disposition of an amendment, then, is not necessarily an
unequivocal indicator that only the language ultimately enacted
comports with the legislative will. Nevertheless, the use of journals
is regarded as reliable in the vast majority of cases. This view will
undoubtedly persist.
X. POST-ENACTMENT STATEMENTS
Statements of legislators subsequent to the enactment of a statute
are generally disapproved as evidence of legislative intent, whether
by affidavit, oral testimony, or otherwise." In the federal courts,
such statements are entitled to little or no weight at all. A recent
federal case explained the rationale this way:
Such statements are not offered by way of committee report and
are not offered for response by other members of the law-making
body. The intent which is helpful in interpreting a statute, is the
82. C. SANDS, supra note 6, § 48.18.
83. Numerous decisions reject post-enactment statements: Waterman S.S. Corp. v.
United States, 381 U.S. 252 (1965); N.C. Freed Co. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys., 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973) (letter of sponsor one year after enactment entitled to no
weight); Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Lynden Trans., Inc. v. State, 532 P.2d 700 (Alaska 1975)
(testimony of sponsor rejected); Wiseman v. Madison Cadillac Co., 88 S.W.2d 1007 (Ark.
1936); Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc. v. City of Pittsburg, 52 Cal. App. 3d 983 (Ct. App. 1975); Bayon
v. Beckley, 93 A. 139 (Conn. 1915); Security Feed & Seed Co. v. Lee, 189 So. 869 (Fla. 1939);
Decker v. Russell, 357 S.W.2d 886 (Ky. 1962); D & W, Inc. v. City of Charlotte, 151 S.E.2d
241 (N.C. 1966); Financial Indem. Co. v. Cargile, 288 N.E.2d 861 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1972);
Murphy v. Nilsen, 527 P.2d 736 (Or. Ct. App. 1974); City of Philadelphia v. Depuy, 244 A.2d
741 (Pa. 1968); Bowaters Carolina Corp. v. Smith, 186 S.E.2d 761 (S.C. 1972); City of Spo-
kane v. State, 89 P.2d 826 (Wash. 1939) (affidavits of over 100 legislators excluded); Wiscon-
sin S. Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 205 N.W.2d 403 (Wis. 1973). Other decisions approve
use of post-enactment statements: Alaska Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 525 P.2d 12 (Alaska
1974) ("cautious" evaluation of sponsor's affidavit-some weight); Campbell v. Board of
Dental Examiners, 53 Cal. App. 3d 283 (Ct. App. 1975); In re John Children, 306 N.Y.S.2d
797 (Fam. Ct. 1969) (letter from assemblyman); Neff v. Cleveland Trust Co., 21 Ohio Op.
461 (Com. P1. 1941) (letters from legislators); Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 89 N.W. 460
(Wis. 1902) (panel testimony of legislators).
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intent of the legislature and not of one of its members. For pur-
poses of statutory construction, a legislative body can only speak
through a statute, with the words that are used in light of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment.84
Florida is in accord with the majority view in rejecting post-
enactment statements of legislators. In Security Feed & Seed Co.
v. Lee,85 the Florida Supreme Court relied on prior case law in
refusing to consider senators' affidavits as legislative intent: "The
law appears settled that such testimony is of doubtful verity if at
all admissible to show what was intended by the Act. Lewis and
Southerland, Statutory Construction, 882."l This state of affairs
regarding post-enactment statements adds emphasis to the need to
identify and preserve other sources for determining legislative in-
tent.
XI. METHODS OF PRESENTATION
Authorities disagree on the proper method of presenting statutory
history to the courts. One view holds that the attorney must present
extrinsic data in the trial court to preserve the record, since an
appellate court cannot be compelled to consider matters outside the
record. On the other hand, courts often consider other judicially
noticeable facts for the first time on appeal, and a rigid rule in the
case of statutory history seems harsh. Moreover, technical rules of
evidence may inhibit the presentation at trial. 7 To add a margin of
safety, the lawyer is probably well advised to attempt the introduc-
tion of statutory history in the lower court. Any difficulties encoun-
tered will then be preserved for appeal.8
XII. SUMMARY
In Florida, anyone interested in statutory history must be both
diligent and fortunate. The researcher may strike gold at the legisla-
tive library. If he does not, he must determine what committees
84. Epstein v. Resor, 296 F. Supp. 214, 216 (N.D. Cal. 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); see United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S,
258 (1947).
85. 189 So. 869 (Fla. 1939).
86. Id. at 870.
87. The primary problem is the requirement of authentication. Stringham argued in
Crystal Gazing, supra note 10, that extrinsic aids should be regarded as hearsay; however,
no case has been discovered in which the authenticity or the verity of extrinsic aids offered
by a party were in dispute.
88. See READ, MACDONALD, FORDHAN & PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (3d ed. 1973);
Trends, supra note 70, at 595.
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handled the bill and consult them, hoping meanwhile that relevant
materials still exist and can be found. The search must be carried
on at least twice: once in the house and once in the senate. And
perhaps the search will lead to the legislative library and the state
archives as well. The fact that few Florida cases test the propriety
of using extrinsic aids further suggests the inadequacy of current
procedures.
On the other hand, if historical materials are available in Florida,
the courts can be expected to rely on them in construing statutes
for three reasons. First, and of greatest importance, the Florida
decisions reveal a judicial willingness to rely on materials outside
the statute. Second, the overwhelming weight of national authority
approves the use of extrinsic aids. Third, statutory history can be a
valuable tool in construing an ambigious provision and confirming
a result reached through other means, even where the language is
clear. As Justice Murphy once remarked: "[Wiords are inexact
tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law
forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how
'clear the words may appear on superficial examination.' ,
There may be problems in determining how much weight to ac-
cord particular legislative history. Also, there is potential for judi-
cial abuse in selective reliance on the sources which will support a
desired result. However, such factors already inhere in the judicial
process. In the absence of extrinsic aids, a court need only announce
that the meaning of the language is "plain" or apply the intrinsic
canon which will yield the favored result.
The case law and scholarly commentary suggest that the follow-
ing criteria and standards are significant in evaluating the probative
force of extrinsic aids:
(1) Contemporaneity - Materials developed before and during
the process of consideration are given greater weight than later ef-
forts to explain the intended meaning. In addition, the greater the
time between the development of the extrinsic aid and the instant
of legislative action, the less persuasive the aid.
(2) Credibility - The more explanatory and analytical and less
contrived the extrinsic aid, the greater the weight it will be ac-
corded. Therefore, reports of committees are generally regarded
with respect by the courts. Floor debates, on the other hand, have
been excluded as too unreliable in many jurisdictions.
(3) Proximity - The closer the source of the aid to the essence
of legislative action, the more persuasive the aid is viewed by the
89. Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1950).
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courts. For instance, a substantive report by a conference commit-
tee would probably be given greater weight than a conflicting report
by a standing committee. Likewise, remarks by a committee chair-
man, floor manager, or sponsor of a bill are regarded as more per-
suasive than statements by other legislators.
(4) Context - The weight given a particular aid will vary de-
pending on other factors in the legislative history of the statute,
such as consensus and availability. Was the member's remark or
explanation accepted or opposed by others? How closely does the
enacted bill conform to the recommendation of the committee
whose report is offered as evidence of legislative intent? How likely
is it that legislators were aware of the existence of the aid?
These criteria and standards overlap. In any event, they must be
considered in relation to one another. The entire context must deter-
mine the final, cumulative weight to be given any particular extrin-
sic aid. As Justice Frankfurter once remarked:
Unhappily, there is no table of logarithms for statutory construc-
tion. No item of evidence has a fixed or even average weight. One
or another may be decisive in one set of circumstances, while of
little value elsewhere. A painstaking, detailed report by a Senate
Committee bearing directly on the immediate question may settle
the matter. A loose statement even by a chairman of a committee,
made impromptu in the heat of debate, less informing in cold type
than when heard on the floor, will hardly be accorded the weight
of an encyclical. 0
XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS
We have seen that the courts are favorably disposed toward ac-
cepting extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. We have
also seen that use of such aids in Florida is very difficult, not be-
cause of any reservations of Florida courts, but because there is no
systematic means by which such materials are developed, collected,
and preserved. It would appear, therefore, that recommendations
seeking to facilitate the documentation of legislative intent should
relate to procedural improvements in legislative management as
well as to articulation of specific aids. The recommendations which
follow deal primarily with such procedural matters, most of which
can be implemented without additional legislation or any signifi-
cant increase in cost. These recommendations, if implemented,
would provide a simple, systematic means of locating and docu-
menting materials which bear significantly on legislative intent.
90. Reading of Statutes, supra note 12, at 543.
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(1) The most immediate need is to identify or select a single or
central repository for materials revealing legislative intent. Pres-
ently, such materials are kept variously by the clerk of the house of
representatives, the secretary of the senate, the legislative library,
the various house and senate committees, and the secretary of state.
This responsibility should be vested in the Department of State,
which already is the principal agency responsible for records man-
agement and for maintaining many documents bearing on legisla-
tive intent. This recommendation would not infringe on the respon-
sibility of the clerk and secretary to administer the legislative pro-
cess, the legislative library to provide an information resource to the
legislature, or the committees to consider legislation and make rec-
ommendations to their respective houses.
(2) Another important need is for the development of a uniform
policy on the retention of relevant materials. Presently, various
materials are retained for differing lengths of time and are disposed
of differently. Materials which bear on legislative intent should be
retained a minimum of ten years.
(3) Each general bill which is introduced should be accompa-
nied by a sponsor's statement of explanation and intent. The format
of such a statement should be prescribed by the legislative leader-
ship and should be as nearly identical as possible for the two houses.
At the least, these statements should provide a general overview of
the purpose of the legislation. This general statement should be
supplemented with a brief explanation of purpose and intent for
each section or other major subdivision of the bill.
A resolution incorporating this general idea was introduced in the
regular session of the 1977 legislature but failed. House Concurrent
Resolution 268 would have required each bill enacted into law to
"include a statement of the specific intent of the Legislature includ-
ing clear and unambiguous statements as to its applicability, scope,
and exceptions and guidelines for its proper administration. . . by
state or local officials."
An approach for which the procedural framework already exists
is offered by the statutory Economic Impact Statements, which
have been discussed previously. To implement this idea, it is sug-
gested that such statements be prepared in both houses for all legis-
lation, and that the forms and procedures employed be unified in
the house and the senate.
(4) Committees should be required to issue committee reports
on all general bills reported favorably. These reports would not be
the extensive narrative or analytical reports sometimes prepared by
committees for major legislation. Rather, they would be similar to
the statements of sponsors recommended above. These reports
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should be distributed to the membership as a part of floor considera-
tion of general legislation. Of course, more detailed and analytical
reports should also be prepared and distributed to the membership,
especially on major legislation.
(5) Conference committees should prepare and submit more
substantive reports regarding the resolution of differences in legisla-
tion and the rationale or intent of those changes.
(6) Committees, legislators, and their staffs should be required
to file with the clerk of the house of representatives or with the
secretary of the senate a copy of any material which is distributed
to the membership of the respective houses relating to legislation
under consideration. This would include reports, memoranda, fact
sheets, and other such material which seeks to analyze, explain,
i"sell," or defend legislation.
(7) For each legislative biennium, the secretary and the clerk
should maintain a master file on each bill, into which would be
placed all appropriate materials relating to legislative intent. At the
end of the biennium, these officers would transmit the files to the
Department of State for retention. The files should be merged, and
duplicative materials should be discarded. Then the files relating to
unsuccessful legislation should be disposed of in a fashion consistent
with state records management policy. Files on enacted bills should
be retained for a period determined by the Department of State-a
period of at least ten years.
(8) All hearings of committees and subcommittees should be
electronically recorded by committee staff. The tapes of these hear-
ings should be placed in containers on which would be marked the
date of the hearing and the bill numbers of legislation considered.
These tapes should be maintained securely in the committee offices
for a period of time determined by each house to allow for needed
in-office reference-perhaps no more than thirty days. Then the
tapes would be delivered to the secretary or the clerk, who would
maintain them securely until the end of the legislative biennium.
At that time, they would be forwarded to the Department of State
for retention with other legislative materials.
(9) Floor debates in each house should be recorded and the tapes
appropriately annotated for easy reference. The tapes should be
retained by the secretary and the clerk for two years after the con-
clusion of the legislative session, then forwarded to the Department
of State with other materials.
(10) Consideration should be given to a more liberal policy re-
garding insertion of materials (statements or memoranda) in the
Senate and House journals where such material was presented on
the floor and is available in written form. Because of difficulties in
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daily production of the journals, insertion of verbal statements not
delivered from a written text, which would require transcription,
should continue to be disallowed.
(11) Committee and floor debate on major legislation should be
fully transcribed and inserted in the master file of the bill. Stan-
dards should be developed to determine which legislation is "major"
for this purpose.
(12) The annual legislative "letter of intent" should be placed
in the master file of the appropriations act.
(13) To implement recommendations 1 and 2, legislation pro-
viding the necessary authorization for the Department of State
should be enacted.
(14) To implement recommendations 3-11, appropriate amend-
ments should be made to the rules of the Florida Senate and the
Florida House of Representatives.
XIV. CONCLUSION
This article has examined various extrinsic aids to statutory con-
struction, considered the reliability of and judicial attitudes toward
such material, and offered alternative methods for increasing the
availability of reliable statutory history in Florida. By providing the
courts with a panoply of reliable legislative history, the legislature
can help judges discern and apply legislative intent.
Florida judges now must rely primarily on the canons of construc-
tion, synopsized journal remarks, untranscribed tapes of proceed-
ings, and visceral disposition when called upon to construe an am-
biguously drafted statute. Commenting on the pitfalls of loose legis-
lative drafting, Justice Frankfurter reminded his audience of the
cartoon in which one legislator said to his collegues, "I admit this
new bill is too complicated to understand. We'll just have to pass it
to find out what it means." 9' Development and preservation of ex-
trinsic aids should enable courts to discern and perpetuate legisla-
tive intent in a more predictable and reliable manner.
91. Id. at 545.
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